Florida Law Review
Volume 51

Issue 3

Article 6

January 1999

Employer Liability for Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment
Created by Supervisors Under Title VII: Towards a Clearer
Standard?
Joy Sabino Mullane

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Joy Sabino Mullane, Employer Liability for Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Created by
Supervisors Under Title VII: Towards a Clearer Standard?, 51 Fla. L. Rev. 559 (1999).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol51/iss3/6

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Mullane: Employer Liability for Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Crea

EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CREATED BY SUPERVISORS UNDER
TITLE VII: TOWARDS A CLEARER STANDARD?
Joy Sabino Mullane*

I.

INTRODUCTION ......................................

II.

EMPLOYER LIABILrTY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT

BEFORE FARAGHER AND BURLINGTON IND USTRIES

559

...........

560

III. FARAGHER: BACKGROUND AND LOWER COURT TREATMENT ... 567
A. Decision in the DistrictCourt and Court of Appeals ...... 567
570
B. The Eleventh Circuit Court ofAppeals Dissent ...........
IV. THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS .................
A. Faragher: The Supreme CourtMajority Opinion ..........
B. Burlington Industries: The Majority Decision in
the Companion Case to Faragher ......................

572
572
575

V. THE DISSENT INFARAGHER AND BURLINGTONINDUS TRIES..... 578
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT STATE OF EMPLOYER

LIABILTY FOR SUPERVISOR-CREATED HOSTILE
ENvIRONMENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT ....................
VII. CONCLUSION

....................................

579
585

I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine going to work, turning on your computer, and discovering that,
once again, the office manager has sent you pornographic e-mail. This has
been occurring every day for about one week. You know that the employer
has a sexual harassment policy, and today you decide to follow the proper
procedure and file a complaint. After receiving the complaint, the employer
* To my husband, Greg-because you loved me. This Casenote is also dedicated to my
parents, Paula Habib and William Sabino, for their unconditional love and support. I would also
like to give special thanks to Professor Betsy Ruff, Professor Rebecca Karl, and Professor Michael
Millender, for their inspiration and guidance.
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takes prompt and appropriate remedial action. Under this scenario, would
the employer be liable in a court of law to the employee for the harm
caused by these acts of harassment?
This Casenote explores the changing area of employer liability for
supervisor-created hostile environment sexual harassment' in the wake of
two recent Supreme Court decisions.2 To this end, Part II explains the
conflict that existed prior to the Supreme Court cases. Part III focuses on
the reasoning of the lower courts' opinions in the Faraghercase as a
backdrop for highlighting how the recent decisions have changed this area
of the law. Part IV sets forth the new controlling principles for employer
liability for supervisor-created hostile environment sexual harassment
outlined in the Faragherand BurlingtonIndustriesmajority opinions. Part
V focuses on the dissent in BurlingtonIndustries,which was incorporated
into the dissent of Faragher.Part VI analyzes the current state of employer
liability for supervisor-created hostile environment sexual harassment and
highlights the ambiguities arising from the Supreme Court's recent
decisions. Part VII presents the Conclusion of this Casenote.
II. EMPLOYER LiABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT
BEFORE FARAGHER AND B URLINGTON IND USTRES

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an
employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect to [such
individual's] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's... sex."3 A violation of Title
VII may be predicated on either of two types of sexual harassment: quid
pro quo or hostile environment.4 Before Faragher and Burlington
Industries, quid pro quo sexual harassment "involve[d] the conditioning
of concrete employment benefits on sexual favors"5 (now, quid pro quo
harassment only exists when job threats are actually carried out6 ). Hostile
environment sexual harassment is harassment so severe or pervasive as "to
alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive
1. There are two types of sexual harassment: quid pro quo and hostile environment. Since
the law regarding quid pro quo sexual harassment is fairly well settled, see infra pp. 563, this
Casenote focuses on hostile environment sexual harassment. Additionally, case law divides
employer liability for hostile environment sexual harassment into two group of harasses: coemployees and supervisors. Again, since the law involving co-employees is fairly well settled,
uniformly applying a negligence standard, this Casenote only explores hostile environment sexual
harassment committed by supervisory personnel.
2. See Faragherv. CityofBocaRaton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth,
118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
4. See Burlington Indus., 118 S. Ct at 2264.
5. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,62 (1986).
6. See Burlington Indus., 118 S.Ct. at 2264.
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working environment."7 The Supreme Court case that established hostile
environment sexual harassment as a violation of Title VII, regardless of
whether the plaintiff suffered an economic or tangible loss, was Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson. However, the Court set no clear guidelines for
determining when an employer is liable for the hostile work environment
created by its supervisory employees. 9
In Meritor,the Supreme Court directed courts to look to principles of
agency law, referring them to the Restatement (Second) of Agency sections
219-237, in determining an employer's liability for actions of its
employees. 0 While directing the courts to look to principles of agency law,
7. See Meritor,477 U.S. at 67 (citing Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1lth Cir.
1982)).
8. 477 U.S. 62 (1986). In Meritor,Michelle Vinson was hired to work as a teller by Sidney
at 59. Vinson worked at the branch for four
Taylor, the vice president of the bank branch. See id.
years and was promoted several times to become the assistant branch manager. See id. After taking
at 60. Thereafter, Vinson filed suit claiming
an indefinite sick leave, Vinson was discharged. See id.
that throughout the four years of her employment, she had "constantly been subjected to sexual
harassment." Id.
Vinson alleged that after working for a short time, Taylor invited her out to dinner and
Fearing for her job, Vinson eventually agreed. See id.
suggested they have sexual relations. See id.
Vinson testified that during the fouryears of her employment, she and Taylor had intercourse 40-50
times. See id. Taylor also fondled her in front of other employees, exposed himself to her
repeatedly, and raped her a few times. See id.This behavior apparently ceased when Vinson started
Vinson never reported the harassment or used the company's complaint
dating a boyfriend. See id.
procedure because she was afraid of Taylor. See id. at 61.
At the district court level, the court denied relief to Vinson on the grounds that if there was a
sexual relationship between the parties, the relationship was voluntary and had nothing to do with
her employment at the bank. See id. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed,
noting that a claim of sexual harassment can be premised on two types of harassment: quid pro quo
and hostile environment. See id. at 62. The Court of Appeals believed that Vinson's claim was
based on hostile environment sexual harassment, and that the district court had not considered this
in deciding the case. See id.The Court of Appeals further stated that the voluntariness of the sexual
relationship between Taylor and Vinson was irrelevant if her job was conditioned on these sexual
favors. See id. The Court of Appeals then held the bank strictly liable for this harassment whether
it knew or should have known of its existence, relying on EEOC guidelines which referred to
"agents" of employers. See iL at 63.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed for a different reason from the Court of
Appeals. See id. Here, the Supreme Court established hostile environment sexual harassment as a
valid claim, and then attempted to address an employer's liability for this type of harassment. See
id. at 64. For the Court's discussion of the standards for employer liability, see supra text
accompanying note 7.
9. See, e.g., Faragher,118 S. Ct. at2284 ("While indicating the substantive contours of the
hostile environments forbidden by Title VII, our cases have established few definite rules for
determining when an employer will be liable for a discriminatory environment... "'). One of the
few well established rules regarding hostile environment sexual harassment is that such harassment
must be objectively and subjectively offensive. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22
(1993).
10. See 477 U.S. at 72 (stating that the court agrees "with the EEOC that Congress wanted
courts to look to agency principles for guidance in this area."). The Court also stated that agency
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which would require that strict or vicarious liability be imposed when an
employee acts within the scope of their employment,"1 the Court in Meritor
simultaneously rejected the idea of automatic liability.1 2 The Court held
that Title VII would not make employers "automatically liable for sexual
harassment by their supervisors."13 However, the Court also stated that lack
of notice to the employer of the harassing conduct would not necessarily
insulate an employer from liability. 4 Additionally, "the mere existence of
a grievance procedure and a policy against [sexual harassment], coupled
with the [victim's] failure to invoke [the grievance] procedure" would not
necessarily insulate an employer from liability. 5
Directing courts to look to the Restatement (Second) of Agency has
caused much confusion among the federal courts of appeals as to the
standard to be applied in hostile environment sexual harassment cases. 6 In
section 219, the Restatement (Second) of Agency sets forth five distinct
standards for liability. 17 Before Faragherand BurlingtonIndustries,most
courts required a plaintiff to satisfy the requirements for direct, rather than
strict or vicarious, liability, or some combination thereof. 8 The federal
courts of appeals have used the standards set forth in the Restatement

principles may not be completely transferable to Title VII issues. See id.
11. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(1) states that "[a] master is subject to liability for
the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958); see also infra pp. 565-66.
12. See Meritor,477 U.S. at 72 (stating that the "Court of Appeals erred in concluding that
employers are always automatically liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors").
13. Id.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. See David B. Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability of
Employersfor Sexual HarassmentCommitted by TheirSupervisors,81 CORNELLL. REV. 66, 131
(1995).
17. The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 (1958) states:
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while
acting in the scope of their employment.
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside
the scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and
there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFAGENCY § 219 (1958).
18. See Oppenheimer, supra note 16, at 70; see also infra pp. 563-64.
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(Second) of Agency in various and alternative ways, leading to an ad hoc
approach to determining employer liability for hostile environment sexual
harassment. As to quid pro quo sexual harassment, the circuits have
uniformly held that an employer is strictly liable for sexual harassment
committed by its supervisory personnel.19 Nonetheless, the circuits have
been extremely reluctant to apply the same standard that is applied in quid
pro quo cases to hostile environment cases.2" The direct liability standard
26
24
has been used by the First,21 Second,' Third,' Fourth, Fifth,21 Seventh,
Eighth,27 Ninth,28 Tenth, 29 and Eleventh30 Circuits. The vicarious liability
standard premised on actual or apparent authority has been used by the
Second,31 Third,32 Tenth,33 Eleventh, 34 and D.C.35 Circuits. Finally,
respondeat superior has been used by the Fourth,3 6 Sixth,37 Seventh,38 and
Eleventh39 Circuits. Thus, there has been no clear standard the courts of

19. See Faragher,118 S. Ct at 2284; Frederick J. Lewis & Thomas L. Henderson, Employer
Liabilityfor "HostileWorkEnvironment" SexualHarassmentCreatedby Supervisors: The Search
Foran AppropriateStandard,25 U. MEM. L. REV. 667, 669 (1995).
20. For one possible reason as to the difference in treatment between quid pro quo and hostile
environment sexual harassment, see Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813,856 (1991)
(arguing that courts perceive hostile work environment sexual harassment as less serious than quid
pro quo, and thus require a higher standard of proof). See also Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2287
(acknowledging the disparate treatment); Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2272 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(comparing hostile environment racial harassment to hostile environment sexual harassment).
21. See Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir. 1988) (applying the Title
VII standard in the Title IX context).
22. See Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 1997).
23. See generallyBouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that
a harasser, by sexually harassing an employee, acts contrary to the employer's and employee's
interests).
24. See Andrade v. Mayfair Management Inc., 88 F.3d 258, 261-62 (4th Cir. 1996).
25. See Nash v. Electrospace Sys., Inc., 9 F.3d 401,404 (5th Cir. 1993).
26. See Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., Gen. Motors, 32 F.3d 1007, 1012 (7th Cir. 1994).
27. See Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 564-66 (8th Cir. 1992).
28. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 1991).
29. See Hirase-Doi v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 61 F.3d 777,784 (10th Cir. 1995).
30. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530, 1535 (11th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter
FaragherI]; Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1989).
31. See Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 1997); Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14
F.3d 773, 780 (2d Cir. 1994).
32. See Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1994).
33. See Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 552 (10th Cir. 1994).
34. See Faragherl,111 F.3d at 1535; Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554,
1558 (11th Cir. 1987).
35. See Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
36. See Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1353 (4th Cir. 1995).
37. See Kaufman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 183 (6th Cir. 1992).
38. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., 102 F.3d 848, 859-62 (7th Cir. 1996).
39. See Faragherl,111 F.3d at 1536.
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appeals have been following, and in fact, some circuits have used several
as alternative theories.
Under the direct liability' standard, the employer is held directly liable
as a result of its own negligence, or recklessness.4" The two main prongs
of this test are: whether the employer knew or should have known of the
harassment, and whether the employer failed to take prompt, adequate
remedial action. The courts have made a distinction with regard to the
applicable standard based on the harasser's status as either a supervisor or
a co-employee.42 Generally, "[iln cases of co-employee harassment,
liability [is] imposed on the employer only when the employer [is] directly
liable due to negligent or reckless conduct, when the employer ratifie[s] the
harassment after it occur[s]."43 However, some circuits also have used this
standard for cases where the harasser is a supervisor, making little or no
distinction.'
Some circuits have attempted to hold supervisory personnel to a higher
standard than regular employees. One of the vicarious liability standards
that the courts have been willing to use is actual or apparent authority.4'
Under this standard, an employer is only liable if the harassing supervisor
purported to speak or act on behalf of the employer while engaging in the
harassing conduct, or if the harasser was aided in his conduct by the
existence of the agency relationship.' To some extent, sexual harassment
is always aided by the existence of the agency relationship "because [the]
responsibilities [of a supervisor] include close proximity to and regular
contact with the victim."'4 7 However, the courts have required a more direct
link between the agency relationship and the harassing conduct, construing
this standard narrowly.4"

40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(b) (1958) ("A master is not subject
to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their employment, unless... the
master was negligent ....
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

).

See Faragherl, 111 F.3d at 1535.
See, e.g., id.
Oppenheimer, supra note 16, at 73-74.
See id.at 132-136 (discussing cases from theThird, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits).
See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d) (1958).

A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the
scope of their employment, unless ... the servant purported to act or to speak on
behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was
aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.
Id.
46. See Lewis & Henderson, supra note 19, at 679.
47. Faragherl,111 F.3dat 1537.
48. See, e.g., Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding an employer
liable where the harasser used the appearance of his authority to sexually harass the victim, that is,
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Perhaps the most stringent standard is vicarious liability based on the
theory of respondeat superior. 49 Here, the employer is strictly liable for the
harasser's conduct if the harasser was a supervisor acting within the scope
of employment."0 However, the federal courts of appeals, except for the
Seventh Circuit, have either combined this test with one of the prongs of
the direct liability test so that the strictness of this standard is diminished,
or have narrowly construed the meanings of "in the scope of employment"
or "supervisor.""1 This greatly diminishes the ability of a plaintiff to
effectively bring a claim against an employer.
Every circuit, except for the Seventh and the Eleventh, has held that
even where harassment occurs by a supervisor within the scope of
employment, if the employer takes prompt remedial action, it is not liable
to the injured employee.52 Thus, unless the plaintiff can prove the employer
is liable on the basis that the harasser used actual or apparent authority to
accomplish the harassment, the plaintiff's claim will fail. This violates the
principles of standard agency law that hold an employer absolutely liable
for acts of its employees committed in the scope of employment.5 3 Under
traditional agency law, the employer's response "may absolve it of any
direct liability and protect it from punitive damages, but a company's
vicarious liabilities for the acts of its agents carried out within the scope of
their agency is absolute."' 4 This is one of the main contradictions arising
out of Meritor's directive to look to agency law, and yet, not hold
employers strictly liable for the harassing conduct of its agents.
Many federal courts of appeals also have required that the plaintiff
show that the employer had either actual or constructive notice of the
hostile environment sexual harassment.5 5 Requiring the plaintiff to prove

by firing her on the ground that she "owed him"). This standard is very similar to a pre-Faragher
and Burlington Industriesconception of quid pro quo sexual harassment.
49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958).

50. See id.
51. See Nancy L. Abell et al., Circuit by Circuit Review of Selected Sexual Harassment
Issues, CA01 A.L.1.-A.B.A. 609, 613-23 (1995). Meanwhile, there have been different
interpretations as to what constitutes a supervisor. Generally speaking, courts look to whether the
supervisor "exercised significant control over the plaintiff's hiring, firing, or conditions of
employment." Oppenheimer, supra note 16, at 139. Some courts, though, have been reluctant to
classify low-level management employees as supervisors where there is a large management
hierarchy, even though the harasser was the victim's direct supervisor. See, e.g., Daulo v.
Commonwealth Edison, 938 F. Supp. 1388 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (defining supervisor narrowly in the
context of a hostile environment racial discrimination case).
52. See Abell, supranote 51, at 613-23 (looking at case law from each Circuit to answer the
question, 'Ifthe employer responds immediately and in a meaningful manner, can the employer still
be held responsible for the hostile environment variety of sexual harassment claims?").
53. See Oppenheimer, supra note 16, at 132.
54. Id.
55. See idiat 133-134 (discussing cases from the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits).
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that an employer knew or should have known of the harassment, and failed
to take prompt remedial action, is the standard for direct liability, not
vicarious liability. This approach fails to treat direct and vicarious liability
as alternative theories of recovery.56
Additionally, in applying the theory ofrespondeat superior,"7 the federal
courts of appeals have differed in their definition of "scope of
employment." 8 Some circuits have held that supervisors are almost never
acting within the scope of their employment when they sexually harass an
employee and the company has a policy prohibiting sexual harassment.5 9
Under such a view, an employer would almost never be held liable since
"employers rarely employ workers for the purpose of engaging in wrongful
acts."' Other courts have held that employees may be acting within the
scope of their employment even when engaging in acts prohibited by the
employer.61 These courts generally look to the time and place of the acts of
sexual harassment in determining whether they occurred within the scope
of the harasser's employment. 2
Which standard is applied can greatly affect the outcome of a case,
hence leading to different results in different circuits. By deciding
63 and BurlingtonIndustries, the Supreme Court addressed these
Faragher
conflicting standards and offered guidance to the lower courts.

56. See id.at 73.
The array of federal court decisions addressing the relationship between agency
law and sexual harassment by supervisors reveals an exasperating problem.
Federal courts routinely misapply the law of agency. The prevailing line of cases
requires employees to prove not only that the harassing supervisor was acting
within the scope of his employment (vicarious liability), but also that the employer
was reckless or negligent in its supervision (direct liability). Under common-law
theories of agency, proof of either (not both) should be sufficient to impose
liability on the employer.
Id.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 219(1) (1958).
See Oppenheimer, supra note 16, at 136-37.
See, e.g., Faragherl,111 F.3d at 1535.
Oppenheimer, supranote 16, at 132.
See, e.g., Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., 102 F.3d 848, 859 (7th Cir. 1996).
See id.
118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
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Ill. FARAGHER: BACKGROUND AND LOWER COURT TREATMENT

A. Decision in the DistrictCourtand Courtof Appeals
Beth Ann Faragher worked as a lifeguard for the City of Boca Raton in
the Marine Safety Section intermittently for five years. 5 During this time,
one of her supervisors, Bill Terry, subjected Faragher and another
lifeguard, Nancy Ewanchew, to uninvited and offensive touching.' David
Silverman, another supervisor, also made offensive comments and gestures
to both Faragher and Ewanchew.67
The Marine Safety Section had a clear chain of command, in which
both Terry and Silverman were superior to Faragher6 8 Above Terry and
Silverman were city officials who worked for the Parks and Recreation
Department, and who were located far from the Marine Safety
Headquarters at the beach. 9 Lifeguards had little contact with city
officials.70
Faragher and Ewanchew did not complain about their work
environment to the Parks and Recreation Department management during
their employment." They did complain to one of their supervisors, Robert
Gordon, a Marine Safety Lieutenant and Training Captain.72 However, both
Faragher and Ewanchew, along with most of the female lifeguards,
complained to him as a friend and not a superior. 7' Gordon did not report
the complaints to any of his superiors.74
During Faragher's employment, the city adopted a sexual harassment
policy directed to all employees.7' However, the city failed to effectively
disseminate its policy among employees of the Marine Safety Section.76
After Ewanchew resigned, she wrote a letter to the City's Director of
Personnel complaining about the sexually harassing conduct of Terry and
Silverman towards her and other female lifeguards.' This was the first
78
time the City received actual notice of Terry's and Silverman's conduct.

65. See Faragherl,111 F.3d at 1533
66. See id.

67. See id.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See id.
See id.
See id.at 1533.
See id.
See id.

73. See id.
74. See id.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See id. at 1564.
See id.
See id. at 1533.
See id.
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The City investigated the complaint, reprimanded Terry and Silverman,
and disciplined them.79
The district court concluded that Terry and Silverman created a
sufficiently abusive working environment to alter the conditions of
Faragher's employment.8 0 The district court then held the city liable for the
harassment by its supervisory employees based on three theories: the city
was negligent in that it should have known of the hostile environment
given the pervasiveness of the situation;"1 the city was negligent via
Gordon, who as an agent of the city had knowledge and took no action; 2
and the city was liable because Terry and Silverman were acting as agents
of the city. 3
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the district
court was reversed.'I The Eleventh Circuit agreed that Terry's and
Silverman's conduct was severe enough to create a hostile working
environment, but did not agree that the city was liable. 5 The Eleventh
Circuit acknowledged two bases for liability: direct and indirect.86 Under
direct liability an employer is liable if it knew or should have known of the
harassment, and failed to take immediate appropriate remedial action.87
Relying on the Meritor directive to look to agency law and the
Restatement, the Eleventh Circuit held that an employer may be indirectly
liable, regardless of whether it knew or should have known of a superior's
hostile environment sexual harassment: "(1) if the harassment occurs
within the scope of the superior's employment; (2) if the employer assigns
performance of a nondelegable duty to a supervisor and an employee is
injured because of the supervisor's failure to carry out that duty; or (3) if
there is an agency relationship which aids the supervisor's ability or
opportunity to harass the subordinate. 88
While the court articulated that one of the three standards for indirect
vicarious liability is when a harasser is acting within the scope of
employment (respondeat superior), it is clear from the court's discussion
that it would rarely find a supervisor's acts of harassment to be within the
scope of his or her employment.8 9 The Eleventh Circuit chose the
narrowest construction, effectively removing respondeat superior as a
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See id.
See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 864 F. Supp. 1552, 1562-63 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
See id. at 1563.
See id. at 1564.
See id.
See FaragherI, 111 F.3d at 1539.
See id. at 1538-39.
See i at 1535.
See U
Id.at 1535 (citing REsTATiENT (SECOND) OFAGENCy § 219(1), 2(c), 2(d)).
See id. at 1536 n. 6.
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possible basis for liability. The court stated, "This Circuit has concluded
that in a pure hostile environment case, a supervisor's harassing conduct
is typically outside the scope of his employment."' The court noted from
a previous case that a supervisor who harasses is not acting as the
company, nor in the company's interests.9" Hence, the court viewed
respondeat superior as a strict liability standard and stated that "[s]trict
liability is illogical in a pure hostile environment setting" because no quid
pro quo is involved and the harassing supervisor is thus not acting as the
employer.' For these reasons, the court concluded that Faragher's claim
would fail because Terry and Silverman acted in pursuit of their own
personal interests and therefore were not acting within the scope of their
employment.93
The court also held that Faragher's claim failed with regard to
harassment that was aided by the existence of the agency relationship.'
The court acknowledged that in one sense harassment is always aided by
the existence of an agency relationship due to responsibilities which
require close and regular contact with the victim." However, the court
reasoned that "aided" was not to be used that broadly.96 Rather, for
harassment to be "aided" by the agency relationship, the harassment must
be "accomplished by an instrumentality of the agency or through conduct
associated with the agency status."' An example of such use would be a
supervisor literally threatening to fire the victim.9" Since neither Terry nor
Silverman threatened Faragher, and they did not base employment
decisions on her responses to their advances, Terry and Silverman were not
"aided" by the existence of their agency relationship.
The Eleventh Circuit also held that the city was not directly liable for
Terry's and Silverman's harassing conduct overturning the district court's
finding that the city had constructive notice due to the pervasiveness of the
harassment. 9 The court concluded that the intermittent acts of harassment

90. kd at 1534.
91. See id. at 1536.

92. d Even though the court accepted respondeat superior as a legitimate theory, in practice,
it appears the court finds it an inapplicable standard for the facts of most hostile environment cases.
93. See id. at 1536. Looking to the commentary accompanying the Restatement (Second) of
Agency §§ 235 and 236, the court makes it clear that for acts to be within the scope of employment,
those acts must be in some way intended to benefit the employer. See id. at n. 7. However, acts of
harassment are rarely, if ever, "intended" to benefit the employer. See id. at 1537.
94. See id. at 1536.
95. See id 1537.
96. See id.
97. Id
98. See id Again, this standard is very similar to a pre-Faragherand Burlington Industries
conception of quid pro quo. See supra note 48.
99. SeeFaragherl,111 F.3d at 1538-39.
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committed over a long period of time weighed against the pervasiveness
of the harassment."o
B. The Eleventh CircuitCourtofAppeals Dissent
Judge Barkett, in dissent, opined that the majority misapplied the law
to the case. 1 ' Her dissent disagreed with the majority, first, because the
majority limited liability to a "knew or should have known" standard and
failed to appropriately apply traditional agency law concepts of an
employer's responsibility for acts of its agents, and second, because the
majority, in applying the law to the facts, effectively required more than
mere constructive
knowledge, again ignoring traditional agency
10 2
principles.
Addressing direct liability first, she argued that the majority required
more than mere constructive knowledge. 3 Although the majority
concluded that the existence of pervasiveness of harassment does not equal
constructive knowledge, she reasoned that the pervasiveness of harassment
can support an inference of constructive knowledge." ° Furthermore,
constructive knowledge does not require the head of the company to be the
one with knowledge, and rarely will that person have such knowledge.'0
An employer should not be able to avoid liability by merely secluding its
employees at a remote location and putting a low level supervisor in
charge.'0 6
Addressing indirect liability, she thought the majority erred in
"effectively confining liability to instances where an employer has actual
or constructive knowledge."'"2 She noted that the purpose of agency law
is to establish an employer's liability where it has no knowledge.'0 8 She

100. See id. at 1538.
101. See id.at 1539 (Barkett, J., dissenting). The dissent relies heavily on the principles
announced in Meritor.See id. (Barkett, J., dissenting).
102. See id. (Barkett, J., dissenting).
103. See id. at 1540 (Barkett, J.,
dissenting).
104. See id. (Barkett, J., dissenting). "Just as the determination of whether conduct is
sufficiently 'severe and pervasive' to constitute actionable harassment requires evaluation of the
totality of the circumstances, the fact finder [in determining constructive knowledge] must examine
the evidence in the same manner. Again, the egregiousness, as well as the number of the incidents,
is plainly relevant." Id. (Barkett, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted). The pervasiveness argument as
meeting the requirements of constructive knowledge has been accepted by many courts. See, e.g.,
Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 904 (11th Cir. 1988).
105. See Faragherl,111 F.3d at 1541.
106. See id.
107. Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting).
108. See id.
(BarkettJ., dissenting). Referring to Justice Joseph Story, Judge Barkett explained
the purpose of agency law:
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concluded that the city should be liable on either of two bases: first, that
'Terry and Silverman were agents of the city acting within the scope of their
employment under Restatement section 219(1) and second, that Terry and
Silverman were aided in accomplishing the harassment by the existence of
an agency relationship under section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement.1 9
Judge Barkett also attacked the majority for concluding that harassment
is never within a harasser's scope of employment. 10 Relying on the
Restatement she argued that "the proper inquiry in determining" whether
an act is "within the scope of employment" is "whether the conduct is of
the same general nature" as authorized conduct, or incidental to authorized
conduct."' In analyzing the conduct, courts should consider when and
where the action took place, "whether it was foreseeable, the purpose of
the action, whether it served the principal, and the extent of the departure
from normal methods or results."' 12 She reiterated a commonly held view
that one would hope that sexual harassment was never authorized, but a
"supervisor is clearly charged with maintaining a productive, safe work
' 13
environment."
Judge Barkett emphasized the necessity of closely scrutinizing the
power structure "within a workplace to determine the extent to which the
particular agency relationship has empowered the supervisor to use or
abuse his position to accomplish the harassment" in order to correctly
apply the principles of the Restatement.!1 4 The power structure at the
Marine Safety Section granted the supervisors "virtually unchecked

[A] principal "is held liable to third persons in a civil suit for the frauds, deceits,
concealments, misrepresentations, torts, negligences, and other malfeasances, or
misfeasances, and omissions of duty, of his agent, in the course of his
employment, although the principal did not authorize, orjustify, or participate in,
or, indeed, know of such misconduct, or even if he forbade the acts, or
disapproved of them... ." This rule of holding a principle liable for the acts of its
agent is based on "the consideration that it is the principle who makes it possible
for the agent to inflict the injury."
Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
109. See id. (Barkett, J., dissenting).
110. See id. at 1542 (Barkett, J., dissenting). ("The Restatement [§ 230] clearly states that 'an
act, although forbidden, or done in a forbidden manner, maybe within the scope of employment..').
111. Id. at 1542 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (referring to the Restatement (Second) of Agency §
299).
112. Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting); see Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 184 (6th
Cir. 1992); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630,636 (6th Cir. 1987).
113. See Faragher,111 F.3d at 1542 (Barkett, ., dissenting).
dissenting) (citing Southern BellTel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503,
114. Id. at 1544 (Barkett, J.,
1515 (1Ith Cir. 1989) and Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1559 (1 1th Cir.
1987)).
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authority over the work environment. 115 Terry, in particular, gave out
work assignments, was in charge of disciplinary actions, and "interviewed
and selected new lifeguards subject to approval." 1 6 As such, it was Terry's
duty to provide a safe and productive working environment. 17 The city's
power structure isolated Faragher from city management and placed Terry
and Silverman in direct control of Faragher's daily work environment,
providing Faragher with "no effective avenue for redress." '
IV. THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

A. Faragher: The Supreme CourtMajority Opinion
After reviewing the history of development of sexual harassment law,"1 9
the Supreme Court analyzed the court of appeals decision in Faragher.
Turning first to the theory of respondeat superior, the Court acknowledged
that most federal courts of appeals have held that hostile environment
sexual harassment is outside the harasser's scope of employment based on
similar reasoning to that of the Eleventh Circuit. 20 Acts of harassment
which create a hostile environment are considered to be motivated by the
supervisor's own personal desires, unrelated in any way to the employer or
employment relationship. 121 The Court is quick to point out that in contexts
other than sexual harassment, courts have taken a much broader view of
what actions are within the scope of employment. The Court did not try
to reconcile this contradiction noting that "it is enough to recognize that
their disparate results do not necessarily reflect varying terms of the
particular employment contracts involved, but represent differing
judgments about the desirability of holding an employer liable for his
subordinates' wayward behavior."123
Given this, the Court analyzed the different reasons both in favor of,
and against, classifying harassing behavior as within the scope of
employment, and therefore placing the risk of liability on employers.1 14 The
fact that supervisors are in charge of maintaining the atmosphere of the

115. Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting).
116. l (Barkett, J., dissenting).
117. See id. (Barkett, L,dissenting).

118. Id.
(Barkett, J., dissenting). Remember, the district court had already concluded that the
city failed to effectively disseminate its sexual harassment policy. See id. (Barkett, J., dissenting).
119. See Faragher,118 U.S. at 2282-86.
120. See id.at 2286 (citations omitted); but cf.Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343,
1351-52 (4th Cir. 1995); Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 184 (6th Cir. 1992)).
121. See Faragher,118 U.S. at 2286-87.
122. See id.

123. Il at 2287.
124. See id. at 2288.
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work environment which can inure to the benefit or detriment of the
employer argues in favor of placing the burden on employers." s Arguably,
sexual harassment should just be another one of the foreseeable risks of
the burden of which should fall on the employer and not
doing business,
126
the victim.
However, the Court concluded otherwise. The Court found it more
reasonable to consider sexual harassment to be beyond the scope of
employment because it usually serves no interest of the employer."z
Another reason the Court decided that harassing conduct should fall
outside a supervisor's scope of employment is that negligence is the
standard uniformly used for co-employee harassment, which implicitly
states that harassment is not in the scope of employment for regular
employees." Any difference in the standard applied to a supervisor would
be based on the conferment of particular authority through the agency
relationship and would therefore be irrelevant to a scope of employment
129
analysis, and better analyzed under other vicarious liability standards.
In analyzing vicarious liability under section 219(2)(d) of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency, the Court distinguished two separate
standards of liability: "the servant purported to act or speak on behalf of
the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority;"'' ° and the
servant "was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency
relation.""13 This distinction lies in the difference between circumstances
where harassment occurs because of a victim's reliance on apparent
authority, and where harassment occurs because the agency relationship
"aided" harassment or enabled harassment to occur. 32 It is a very narrow
line to draw.
It makes sense for an employer to be liable for some tortious conduct
made possible by abuse of supervisory authority.' Thus, the Court
concluded that the appropriate starting point for determining employer
liability is with the second part of section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement,
analyzing the "aided by the agency relationship" standard.1 It is only the
starting point because the Court sees its role as an attempt to "adapt agency
concepts to the practical objectives of Title VII."' 5
125. See id.at 2288 (referring to Judge Barkett's dissent in Faragher1).
126. See i.

127. See id.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See id. at 2289.
See id.
Id. at 2290 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d)).
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 219(2)(d)).
See id.
See id.
See i.

135. Id. at 2290 n.3.
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The Court acknowledged that in one sense a supervisor is always aided
by the agency relationship.136 The supervisor's position of power over the
employee may allow for abuses that would not be present in a co-employee
situation.'37 The Court also acknowledged that employers have a greater
opportunity to prevent misconduct on the supervisory level through
selection, training, and monitoring. 3 '
Despite the good reasons in favor of the vicarious liability standard
based on harassment aided by the existence of an agency relationship, the
Court stated that the Meritordirective of not imposing automatic liability
on an employer must also be satisfied.139 Noting that the risk of automatic
liability is high where unspoken threats of authority are used to create
harassing situations, the court chose to create an affirmative defense an
employer may invoke to safeguard against automatic liability."4 The
affirmative defense would -allow an employer to show that it "had
exercised reasonable care to avoid harassment and to eliminate it when it
might occur, and that the complaining employee had failed to act with like
reasonable care to take advantage of the employer's safeguards and
otherwise to prevent harm that could have been avoided."' 41
Thus, the Court held that an employer is vicariously liable for sexual
harassment created by supervisors (either immediate or successively
higher) with authority over the victim. 42 When no tangible employment
action is taken (hostile environment), an employer may raise an affirmative
defense comprised of two elements: "(a) that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise."143
The Court stated that Title VII's primary objective is to avoid harm;
136. See id. at 2291.
137. See id.
When a fellow employee harasses, the victim can walk away or tell the offender
where to go, but it may be difficult to offer such responses to a supervisor, whose
"power to supervise--[which may be] to hire and fire, and to set work schedules
and pay rates-does not disappear... when he chooses to harass through insults
and offensive gestures rather than directly with threats of firing or promises of
promotion."

Id. (citing Estrich, supra note 20, at 854)).
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See id.
See id
See id.
Id at 2292.
See id 2293.
Id
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thus requiring both employers and employees to pro-actively avoid harm. 1"
For employers, this means that they should provide a reasonable sexual
harassment policy.145 If employees fail to use the policy, and thus mitigate
their own damages, the employer should not
be liable for the resulting
46
harm that the victim could have prevented.1
The Court further stated that proof that an employer has an antiharassment policy, and has promulgated it among employees "is not
necessary in every instance as a matter of law."147 Whether or not a stated
policy is required may be addressed during litigation.1 41 Furthermore, an
employee's failure to use the employer's complaint procedure will
normally be sufficient to establish that the employee unreasonably failed
to avoid harm. 149 Other proof may also be submitted to establish the second
element of the affirmative defense.1 50
The Court concluded by finding it unnecessary to address negligence
as an alternative theory to vicarious liability, and held the city liable for the
hostile work environment of Faragher. 5 ' The Court held that the city did
not exercise reasonable care in preventing sexual harassment due in part,
among other reasons, to the city's failure to disseminate its 15sexual
2
harassment policy to the employees in the Marine Safety Section.
B. Burlington Industries: The Majority Decision in the
Companion Case to Faragher
In Burlington Industries, Kimberly Ellerth alleged that she was
153
harassed by her supervisor at Burlington Industries, Ted Slowik.
Burlington Industries is a large national company with an extended
hierarchy, of which Slowik was a mid-level manager. 154 As a vice president
of one of Burlington's business units, Slowik had the authority to make
hiring and firing decisions subject to the cursory approval of his
56
supervisor. 15 5However, Slowik was not Ellerth's immediate supervisor.'

144. See id. at 2292.

145. See i.
146. See id.

147. Id. at 2293.
148. See id

149. See id
150. See id.
151. See id.
at 2294.
152. See id.
at 2293.
153. See Burlington Indus., 118 S.Ct. at 2262. Procedurally, Burlington Industries was on

appeal from a decision granting summaryjudgment in favor of the employer, therefore, the Supreme
Court took the facts as alleged by Ellerth to be true. See id
154. See id. Burlington Industries had over 50 plants throughout the United States which
employed over 22,000 people. See id.
155. See idEven though Slowik was a vice president, Burlington Industries argued that his
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Ellerth worked out of Chicago and her immediate supervisor reported to
Slowik in New York. 15 7 Throughout Ellerth's employment, Slowik
repeatedly made offensive comments and gestures. 58 Ellerth argued that
three incidents in particular could be construed as threats to deny tangible
job benefits classifying the harassment as quid pro quo, and thus vicarious
liability should be applied.159
A short time after the last of these incidents occurred, Ellerth quit in
response to a warning by her immediate supervisor of the need to return
customers calls promptly."6 At first Ellerth provided reasons for her
resignation that were unrelated to the harassment.'61 A few weeks later
Ellerth sent a letter explaining that she really quit because of Slowik's
behavior.62 Prior to this letter, Ellerth did not inform anyone of Slowik's
harassing behavior, despite her awareness of Burlington's policy against
sexual harassment. 163
At the district court level, the trial judge granted summary judgment to
the employer." While the court found that the work environment was
severe and pervasive enough to be hostile, the court also held that
65
"Burlington neither knew nor should have known" of the harassment.1
The court noted that "there was a quid pro quo 'component' to the hostile
environment," but found that this was only a contributing factor to the

position was not considered upper level management. See id. This argument presumably was made
in an attempt to classify the harassment as more in line with co-worker harassment where the
standard of negligence applies.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id. The first of these incidents occurred on a business trip. See id. Ellerth felt
compelled to accept an invitation to meet Slowik in the hotel lounge where they were staying. See
id. After making comments about Ellerth's breasts, Slowik warned that he could make her work life
hard or easy, and that she should loosen up. See id.
The second incident occurred when Ellerth was interested in a promotion. See id. In speaking
with Slowik about the promotion, he expressed concerns that Ellerth was not "loose enough" while
rubbing herknee. See id. Ellerth received the promotion, and Slowik commented that herpromotion
would require her to be around factory workers who like to look at legs. See id.
The third incident occurred when Ellerth called Slowik to get permission to do something for
a customer. See id. Slowik informed Ellerth that he didn't have any time for her, "unless [she]
wanted to tell [him] what [she was] wearing."Id. When Ellerth called Slowik again afew days later,
he asked whether she had started wearing shorter skirts yet, because that would make herjob easier.
See id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 2263.
165. Id.
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harassment. 1" Recognizing that the state of the law at the time applied
vicarious liability to quid pro quo cases and negligence to hostile
environment cases, the district court chose to apply the latter.167
The Supreme Court framed the issue as follows: whether an employee
who is threatened, "yet suffers no adverse, tangible job consequences, can
recover against the employer without showing the employer is negligent or
otherwise at fault for the supervisor's actions." '68 In the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit the judges disagreed as to which standard should
be applied to the case.169 If the harassing conduct was deemed quid pro
quo, then a vicarious liability standard would apply. 7 But if the
harassment was labeled hostile environment, the Seventh Circuit was
divided as to whether a negligence or vicarious liability standard should
apply. 7 ' The Seventh Circuit was further divided as to whether quid pro
quo threats alone, with no tangible action, were sufficient to qualify for
application of a vicarious liability standard.72 The Supreme Court cleared
up this confusion by holding that quid pro quo harassment occurs when
threats are actually carried out; otherwise it is hostile environment.17 The
Court commented that beyond this initial demarcation, these labels "are of
limited utility."1 74
Because no threats were carried out in Burlington Industries,175 the
Court continued its analysis as if the case was based on a hostile
environment claim.176 Like the FaragherCourt, the BurlingtonIndustries
Court discussed section 219(1) [scope of employment] of the Restatement
and concluded that this section is not applicable to sexual harassment
cases. 7 7 However, the Court continued to discuss section 219(2),
addressing its sub-parts that were not mentioned in Faragher.171 The Court
indicated that the other standards of liability present in section 219(2) were
still viable, although not applicable to the instant case. 179 Importantly,
166. Id.

167. See id.
168. Id. at 2262.
169. See id. at 2263.

170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See iL
173. See id. at 2264.

174. Id.
175. An important fact to the Supreme Court was that although Ellerth's job benefits were
threatened, no tangible action was ever taken. See id. at 2262. In fact, Ellerth was promoted once

during her employment with Burlington Industries. See id.
176. See id. at 2265.

177. See id. at 2267.
178. See id.
179. See id. Other than negligence, the remaining bases of liability are direct liability where
the employer acts with bad intentions under section 219(2)(a) and where a non-delegable duty is

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1999

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 6
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 51

although negligence was not discussed at all in Faragher,Burlington
Industries stated that "[n]egligence sets a minimum standard for employer
liability under Title VII."' 0 This suggests that negligence is a lesser
standard available to plaintiffs should the more stringent vicarious
standard, combined with the employer's affirmative defense, fail.
V. THE DISSENT IN FARAGHER AND BURLINGTON INDUSTRIES

The dissent in Faragher,written by Justice Thomas, aside from
indicating a remand for further proceedings relating to negligence, simply
referred to the more detailed dissent he wrote in Burlington Industries."'
The Burlington Industries dissent began by comparing Title VII sexual
harassment cases to Title VII racial discrimination cases.182 Both were
previously treated similarly with regard to standards to be applied, but now
are treated differently when the claim involves hostile environment."8 3 For
hostile environment racial discrimination a negligence standard is applied,
and vicarious liability is not available as an alternative theory of liability.'
The dissent argued that, like racial discrimination cases, negligence should
also be the only standard applied to hostile environment sexual harassment
cases by stating, "An employer should be liable if, and only if, the plaintiff
proves that the employer was negligent in permitting the supervisor's
' Thus, liability is only imposed "if the employer is
conduct to occur."185
blameworthy in some way." ' 6
Using the same reasoning the majority used to set aside strict liability
under a theory of respondeat superior, the dissent argued that supervisors'
creation of a hostile work environment is outside the scope of their
employment. 8 7 These acts are not in service of the employer. 18 Therefore,
the employer should only be liable if it knew, "or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have known, about the hostile work environment
' The dissent emphasized that hostile
and failed to take remedial action."189
environment acts are specifically of the type that are extraordinarily
difficult to monitor, or protect against.19 Reasonable care is all that can be

involved
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

under section 219(2)(c). See id.
Id.
See Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2294 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See Burlington Indus., 118 S. Ct. 2271-72 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See id at 2272 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See id C'homas, J., dissenting).
1d. at 2271 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
1d. at 2272 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See id. (Thomas, 3., dissenting).
Id. at 2273 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See id. (Thomas, ., dissenting).
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191

required.
However, having set forth a vicarious liability standard subject to an
affirmative defense, which "is a whole-cloth creation that draws no support
from the legal principles on which the Court claims it is based,"1" the
dissent argued this error is made worse by lack of clear explanation or
guidelines, which will only lead to further litigation and confusion in this
area of law. 93 The dissent argued that there is no basis in agency law to
justify the court's holding.194 The dissent interpreted section 219(2)(d) as
dependent upon the plaintiff's belief that the harasser is acting within the
scope of their authority.1 95 Given society today, this is something the
dissent found unlikely."9 Finally, the dissent stated that under the Court's
standard "employers will be liable notwithstanding the affirmative defense,
even though they acted reasonably, so long as the plaintiff in question
fulfilled her duty of reasonable care to avoid harm. In practice, therefore,
employer liability very well may be the rule."197
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT STATE OF EMPLOYER

LiABILrY FOR SUPERVISOR-CREATED HosTILE
ENViRONMENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Very few cases have been decided using the analysis set forth in
Faragherand BurlingtonIndustries.Yet it is already clear that application
and interpretation of these opinions will be divergent, and not as straightforward as the majority may have hoped. As mentioned above, Burlington
Industriesindicates that negligence is still a valid standard to be used, and
one court has already used that approach.19 8 Another court treated the
191. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
192. IL (Thomas, J., dissenting).
193. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
194. See id. at 2274 ('Thomas, ., dissenting).
195. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
196. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
197. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
198. See Cadena v. Pacesetter Corp., 18 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1229 (D. Kan. 1998). Here, Lynn
Cadena was employed as a telemarketer for Pacesetter. See id. at 1223. Her supervisor, Charles
Bauersfeld, began sexually harassing her when he told her that he had a "wet dream" about her. See
id. She immediately complained to the Vice President who shrugged her off and said that Charlie
was like that. See id. Bauersfeld continued to regularly harass Cadena. See id. Again, Cadena
complained to the Vice President after an incident involving Bauersfeld suggesting that Cadena
flash her breasts to boost a co-workers morale. See id. at 1224. The Vice President told her that
Charlie was just having a bad day and got a little crazy. See id. It was not until a week later that the
employer took some action against the harassment. See id. In the meantime, Cadena had submitted
a letter of resignation. See id.
After Cadena filed suit, Pacesetter filed a motion for summary judgement (the suit and motion
were originally filed prior to the recent Supreme Court decisions). See id. at 1222, 1229.
Acknowledging the new vicarious liability standard set forth in Faragherand Burlington, the court
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affirmative defense as a sort of negligence-plus test by applying a
negligence analysis to the first prong, and a contributory negligence
analysis to the second prong."
Just exactly how the two prongs of the affirmative defense work
together is not entirely clear from the Supreme Court opinions. The
conjunction "and" was used to join the two prongs,"° indicating that both
parts must be satisfied for an effective affirmative defense. Therefore, it is
not clear how the following scenario might be resolved: an employer has
a reasonable effective harassment policy, which the victim reasonably uses
to report harassment by the supervisor; the employer takes prompt

also stated: "[O]ur reading of Faragherand Burlington Industries suggests that the negligence
theory continues to be viable." Id. at 1229. Consequently, the court chose to analyze the summary
judgment motion by applying a negligence standard to the claim. See id.
199. See Fall v. Indiana Univ. Bd.of Trustees, 12 F. Supp. 2d 870,880-84 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
Here, Lynn Fall was allegedly sexually harassed by her supervisor Daniel Cohen. See id. at 873.
Fall alleged that the first occurrence of harassment was when Cohen deceived her into reporting to
his office; when Fall tried to leave Cohen's office, he started kissing her and forcing his hand down
Fall's blouse. See id. After this "attack," Fall felt so ill that she vomited. See id. Thereafter, Fall
tried to avoid Cohen, but did not complain to anyone. See id. Subsequently, there were a few
occasions where Fall was voluntarily in Cohen's presence, such as a Christmas party and an art
department reception. See id. At the art department reception, Fall ran into Cohen, who made a
comment that Fall perceived him as a threat to her job. See id. at 873-74.
About a month later, Fall first reported the harassment to her immediate supervisor, who said
that the harassment needed to be reported to someone in a higher position. See id. at 874. Fall's
supervisor also indicated that this was not the first time someone had complained about Cohen. See
id. AfterFall notified theVice-ChancellorofAcademic Affairs, LesterLamon, his firstreaction was
"Oh no,not again." Id. Lamon suggested that Fall inform yet another person of the harassment. See
id. After a few days she then informed Jack Tharp, the Vice Chancellor of Student Affairs at one
of the campus branches. See id Tharp suggested that Fall talk to the University's Affirmative
Action Director, Shirley Boardman. See id. Fall made repeated attempts to contactBoardman before
they were able to meet. See id. After hearing of the harassment, Boardman launched an
investigation. See id. Some disciplinary action was taken against Cohen, but Fall was never
informed of this action. See id.
On a motion for summary judgment, the court analyzed whether the University could be held
liable for the harassment of Fall applying the affirmative defense in Faragher.See id.at 880.
Addressing the first prong of the affirmative defense, the court noted that an employer must also
reasonably prevent harassment, in addition to promptly correcting harassment. See id. at 881. The
court analyzed whether the employer was reasonable in preventing the harassment by applying the
"knew or should have known" aspect of the negligence standard. See idAnd arguably the analysis
used to determine whether the employer was reasonable in correcting the harassment would be the
second part of the negligence standard. In fact, the court stated: 'The first element of the defense
...is akin to the familiar negligence showing." Id at 880.
Here, based on the facts, the court felt a reasonable person could conclude that the university
had prior notice of Cohen's harassment. See id. at 882. Thus, it failed to reasonably prevent sexual
harassment. See id. The court also concluded, as to the second prong of the affirmative defense, that
a reasonable person could find Fall's three month delay in reporting the harassment was not
unreasonably failing to take advantage of preventative and corrective opportunities. See id. at 884.
200. See Faragher,118 U.S. at 2292.
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corrective action, yet the victim still sues for any injuries sustained. In this
situation, the second prong of the affirmative defense is not satisfied. Did
the Supreme Court expect the employer in this situation to be held liable,
even though they have done all that they reasonably could have done to
deal with the situation both before and after? In fact, this is the very result
that Justice Thomas feared in his dissent.
However, this scenario is very unlikely. In the cases that have applied
the affirmative defense, the courts seem very willing to construe the facts
such that the employees were shown to be unreasonable in their care to
avoid the situation. Thus, although some may have feared that establishing
vicarious liability as a standard for supervisor-created hostile environment
sexual harassment would sound a death knell to employers, this does not
appear to be happening in application of this standard at the district court
level.
In actuality, the affirmative defense could prove to be a very strong
weapon in the employers' arsenal. All the employer need do is make sure
that it has an effective policy, and liability on this standard should be fairly
easy to avoid. The defense merely needs to attack the employee's response
to the situation. While this appears to have happened in at least three
cases," it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court intended to put on trial
the already possibly victimized employee for how well they responded to

201. See Montero v. AGCO Corp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1146 (E.D. Cal. 1998); Marsicano
v. American Soc'y of Safety Eng'rs, No. 97 C 7819, 1998 WL 603128, at *7 (N.D. I11.Sept. 4,
1998); Sconce v. Tandy Corp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 773, 778 (W.D. Ky. 1998).
Sconce appears to be the more reasonable application of the Faragheraffirmative defense. In
this case, Nicole Sconce was allegedly sexually harassed by her supervisor. See 9 F. Supp. 2d at
775. The supervisor would grope Sconce and frequently make sexual innuendos. See id. Sconce
never complained while working with her supervisor because she was afraid of retaliation. See id.
Her supervisor warned her not tell anyone. See id. After requesting and being granted a transfer,
Sconce complained to the EEOC. See id. It was not until a complaint was filed that the employer
learned of the harassment. See id.
Applying the affirmative defense to the facts in ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court
first looked to the employer's sexual harassment policy. See id at 778. The court held that Tandy
Corp. had a clear harassment policy against sexual harassment, which did not require reports to be
made to immediate supervisors. See id. Further, the policy helped to assure that there would be no
retaliation. See id.
Addressing the second prong of the affirmative defense, the court noted Sconce's complete
failure to use the sexual harassment policy, of which she was aware. See id. The court stated that
"a threat of termination without more, is not enough to excuse an employee from following
procedures adopted for her protection. To hold otherwise would render the affirmative defense
meaningless." Id. For this reason, the court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment.
See id.
This result appears to be more in line with what the Supreme Court intended. Here, the plaintiff
totally failed to take any action to protect herself, or to provide the employer an opportunity to take
corrective action. In this situation, it would be unreasonable to hold an employer liable for sexual
harassment it knew nothing about and was never given an opportunity to correct.
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acts of harassment. It is easy to understand that people respond differently
to acts of harassment. Some people will report harassment immediately
upon the first occurrence. Others will wait a long period of time, hoping
that the harassment will eventually stop, and not wanting to cause any
trouble. Many will be somewhere in the middle. However, one court has
already held that a victim, who testified that she was afraid to report the
harassment, unreasonably waited too long.' 2
In that case, Carrie Ann Montero was employed by AGCO Corporation
at one of its Parts Distribution Centers, until she resigned. 203 Montero
worked in the business office with Glenn Carpenter, the Warehouse
Manager, and Russ Newmann, the Warehouse Supervisor, two of
Montero's harassers.? 4 AGCO had a policy against sexual harassment
which Montero was aware of, which required reporting harassment to
either the Human Resources Department or her supervisor. 5 The
harassment occurred over a period of two years, but Montero did not report
the harassment until the latter part of the two year period.' 6 At that time
she reported the harassment to a Human Resources Manager in another
state.207 Montero testified that she waited to report the harassment out of
fear. 0 She was afraid of retaliation by the harassers, and afraid that her
confidentiality would not be kept.' 9
Shortly after Montero reported the harassment, AGCO launched an
investigation into the reported harassment.210 This investigation resulted in
one harasser being fired, and two others being severely warned. 21 ' During
the time of the investigation, Montero was on paid administrative leave.21 2
When Montero was scheduled to return to work, she delayed and later
resigned.213
Thereafter she brought suit against AGCO 4 The court granted
summary judgment in favor of AGCO, the employer, applying the
Faragheraffirmative defense. 215 The court found that AGCO had a policy
against sexual harassment of which Montero was aware, and therefore met
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See Montero, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 1146.
See id. at 1144.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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its burden under the first prong of the affirmative defense.2 16 As to the
second prong of the affirmative defense, the court again looked to AGCO's
policy against sexual harassment which provided a reporting mechanism
outside of an immediate supervisor and guaranteed confidentiality within
reason.217 Based on these statements in AGCO's sexual harassment policy,
the court concluded that Montero was unreasonable in waiting two years
to report the harassment.21 Furthermore, since AGCO acted promptly and
took corrective action, the court found that Montero unreasonably failed
to take advantage of
both the preventative and corrective measures
2 19
provided by AGCO.
What this opinion does not adequately take into account is the reality
of how fear may operate in a person who is victimized. Many rational
people are not quick to act. They debate and deliberate for some time
before acting, especially when a highly sensitive issue such as sexual
harassment is involved. Add to this the normal fears that one's action may
be retaliated against, or that one may be labeled a troublemaker, or that one
may not want to call attention to one's self and one's situation, and it is
more than reasonable for a person to wait a significant period of time
before being compelled to take action. Therefore, in the context of
supervisor-created harassment, the focus of analysis should be on an
employer's emotionally detached response to knowledge of sexual
harassment, not the employee's highly personal and individualized sexual
harassment coping process.
Moreover, since AGCO did take prompt corrective action against the
harassment, a question remains as to whether the decision the court
reached could have been based on these facts alone: granting summary
judgment because AGCO had an effective policy against sexual
harassment, and because Montero unreasonably failed to take advantage
of the correctiveaction AGCO provided.' ° If the case could be decided on
that basis alone, there was no need to attack Montero as unreasonably
failing to take advantage of thepreventative opportunities provided by the
sexual harassment policy unless both must be proven to satisfy the second
prong of the affirmative defense.
Similarly, in another recent case, Linda Marsicano left her job at
American Society of Safety Engineers (ASSE) after working only 8 days
due to harassment by her supervisor, Ken Hatter.221 The harassment began
on Marsicano's second day on the job and lasted until her last day of
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work? Again, applying the Faragheraffirmative defense, summary
judgment was granted to Marsicano's employer, ASSE.223 The court found
that ASSE had an effective sexual harassment policy and thus satisfied the
first prong of the affirmative defense.' As to the second prong, the court
first looked to Marsicano's use of the sexual harassment policy.2' Since
Marsicano reported the harassment after working only eight days,
Marsicano argued that she promptly took action against the harassment.226
While the court acknowledged Marsicano's promptness in that respect, the
court looked to another incident to find that Marsicano was unreasonable
in failing to take preventative action. 7
On the morning of Marsicano's last day on the job, her supervisor
Hatter asked her to lunch." The harassment that occurred at that lunch
was the impetus for Marsicano complaining to higher management.229
However, just prior to Marsicano's lunch with Hatter, the person
Marsicano eventually complained to stopped by her office to see how she
was settling in.. At that time, Marsicano made no mention of the
harassment that had been occurring. 1 Since Marsicano did not complain
at that time, but rather waited until after the lunch, the court concluded that
she unreasonably failed to take advantage of a preventative opportunity
provided by her employer.232 The court then addressed whether Marsicano
unreasonably failed to take advantage of corrective opportunities provided
as "relevant to the second
by the employer, referring to this analysis
233
defense."
affirmative
ASSE's
of
element
It appears that the courts are uncertain as to exactly what is required to
be analyzed under the second prong of the defense. Must the employer
establish both unreasonable failure to take preventative and corrective
action, or just one or the other? If the employee is reasonable in taking
advantage of preventative opportunities, can the employer still avoid
liability by establishing unreasonable failure to take advantage of
corrective opportunities? So far, no cases have addressed these issues.
Moreover, in crafting the affirmative defense, the Supreme Court was
concerned with complying with Meritor's directive that employers were
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not to be held strictly liable for hostile environment sexual harassment, yet
they fail to comply with Meritor'sother directive: that the mere existence
of a grievance procedure and a policy against sexual harassment, coupled
with the victim's failure to invoke that procedure, would not necessarily
insulate an employer from liability.2 However, in Faragher,the Supreme
Court went so far as to say that not only is it not always necessary for an
employer to prove that it has a promulgated sexual harassment policy, but
also that an employee's failure to use an outlined grievance procedure will
normally be sufficient to establish that the employee unreasonably failed
to avoid harm."5 This is in direct contradiction to Meritor.Furthermore,
the Court provides no guidance as to when it might be reasonable for an
employee to fail to follow established procedure. Therefore, contrary to
what Justice Thomas feared, in practice, employer liability may very well
never be the rule, 236 except in the most extreme of factual circumstances.
If the affirmative defense is applied as outlined in the cases above,
negligence could actually prove to be the stronger standard for an
employee to sue under. Under negligence, the employee merely can try to
prove that the employer "should have known" about the harassment, and
failed to take prompt remedial action. Under a negligence standard, the
employee can go as far as not even giving actual notice to the employer.
Furthermore, the employee's response to the situation is not attacked and
fully analyzed as under the second prong of the affirmative defense. With
some courts viewing the first prong of the affirmative defense as a
negligence type of standard, it remains to be seen how the negligence
standard and the affirmative defense can co-exist as alternative theories.
VII. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court, after distinguishing quid pro quo from hostile
environment sexual harassment, should have used these cases as an
opportunity to provide a clearly defined standard for employers, as well as
courts, to follow. The Court's two major concerns in this area appear to be
protecting employers from strict liability for all the harassing acts of their
agents, while attempting to emphasize the importance of taking measures
to prevent sexual harassment before it occurs. As such, it would seem that
the majority envisioned the use of the affirmative defense in a way far
different from its current application. With emphasis on prevention of
harassment, the affirmative defense could be read to require employers to
take preventative measures and further bolster those preventative measures

234. See Meritor,477 U.S. at 72.
235. See Faragher,118 S. Ct. at 2293.
236. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2274 (1998) (Thomas & Scalia, JJ.,
dissenting).
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by establishing a history of taking prompt corrective action. As such, not
only the preventative measures, but also the employer's history of swift
and appropriate response in the face of harassment would serve to deter
future personnel from engaging in such acts. Then, if sexual harassment
still occurred, and the employee was reasonable in their response to the
harassment, the employer would be vicariously liable and any postharassment corrective action would not mitigate the employer's liability to
that particular employee. The employee must still act reasonably in
mitigating their own injuries and damages by following appropriate
procedures and acting in a reasonably timely fashion. Reading the
affirmative defense in this way seems logical since the Supreme Court was
attempting to make available a vicarious liability standard for victims of
supervisor-created hostile environment sexual harassment, as opposed to
current district court level treatment which is much more reminiscent of a
negligence-type treatment. It is just this type of treatment that Justice
Thomas feared and specifically addressed in his dissent.
It does seem harsh to hold an employer vicariously liable for the acts of
a harasser, even though it did all it reasonably could to prevent harassment
from occurring, if the employee acts reasonably in their response to the
situation to mitigate their own damages. However, it is logical to place a
stricter standard on supervisor-created hostile environment sexual
harassment, as opposed to co-employee harassment.237 In the supervisor
context, the harasser has specifically been charged with more duties and
responsibilities in the work place environment, and has more influence and
control over the employees. Additionally, as a policy issue, who should
bear the heaviest burden for preventing sexual harassment? The employer
is in the best position to prevent harassment from initially occurring
through hiring practices, sexual harassment policies, sexual harassment
training, and monitoring procedures. The employee is only in the best
position to mitigate the extent of their damages once harassment occurs.
Thus, if an employee allows harassment to continue for an extended period
of time, assuming the employer has reasonably attempted to prevent and
correct harassment in the past, the employer should not be liable for the
full extent of the employee's damages. However, the fact that harassment
(an injury) has occurred, under a vicarious liability standard, requires that
the employer bear some responsibility for the acts of its supervisory
personnel. While such a construction seems harsh, an employer's damages
should be limited. In an ideal world, harassment would not occur. Once
damage has been done, the employer is in the best position to remedy the
237. As to JusticeThomas' identification ofthe disparitybetween sexual harassment and racial
harassment, see supra Part V., hopefully when the appropriate case comes along, the Supreme
Court will again take the opportunity to impose a stricter standard on racial harassment that is
created by supervisors.
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damage that occurred because of its supervisory personnel-but that
damage should be limited to the initial and short-term injuries. Anything
beyond that is the employee's responsibility because they unreasonably
failed to take advantage of the employer's preventative and corrective
stance against harassment in the work place.
As previously mentioned, it remains to be seen how the federal courts
of appeals will apply the affirmative defense, as well as other standards, as
alternative theories to supervisor-created hostile environment sexual
harassment cases. The affirmative defense still creates many ambiguities
that need to be sorted out through the courts; specifically, guidelines for
when an employee acts reasonably in response to harassment.23 8 However,
one thing that seems fairly certain is that the confusion that has plagued
this area of law, leading up to the opinions in Faragherand Burlington
Industries,will in one form or another continue to exist until the legislature
steps in or the Court sets forth a clearly defined standard.

238. See also supra Part VI.
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